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The Q-Word as Red Herring: Why Disparate
Impact Liability Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas
Ian Ayres* and Peter Siegelman**
I. Introduction
The debates over the passage of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act' were marked by passionate disagreement: conservatives objected to
the legislation as an unwarranted interference with employers' freedom of
contract, while liberal supporters considered it a first step toward racial
justice. While disagreement about what employment discrimination law
should do has continued-in much the same form-to this day,3 there has
been surprising consensus about the mechanism by which Title VII actually
works:4 whether it is thought of as inadequate or excessive, Title VII is
* William K. Townsend Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
** Research Fellow, American Bar Foundation and Olin Law and Economics Visiting Fellow,
Yale Law School. Henry Hansmann made helpful comments, as did Keith Hylton on a much earlier
version of some of the ideas. We also gratefully acknowledge many constructive discussions with
members of the Symposium on The Changing Workplace. Dawn Jeglum-Bartusch, Franklin Parlamis,
and Cathy Sharkey provided excellent research assistance.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1994).
2. See ALFRED W. BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAW: THE LAW TRANSMISSION SYSrEM AND EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 43 (1993) ("The common ground between [southern Democrats and
conservative Republicans in the U.S. Senate] was the desire to minimize federal regulation.
Conservative Republicans did not want business hobbled by extensive regulation, and the southern
Democrats had the same conviction about the southern way of life [i.e., segregation]."); Michael E.
Gold, Griggs' Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems, and Origin of the Adverse Impact Definition
of Employment Discrimination and a Recommendation for Reform, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 429, 503-08
(1985) (discussing the debates over the passage of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act in greater
detail).
3. The debate has gone on more or less continuously since 1964, heightening in intensity when
important changes to employment discrimination law-such as the 1972 and 1991 Civil Rights Acts-
were considered by Congress. Recent attacks on the antidiscrimination principle by RICHARD EPSTEIN,
FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992) and DINESH
D'SouzA, THE END OF RACISM (1995), have received widespread notice.
4. Although commentators seem to agree about the mechanism by which antidiscrimination laws
are supposed to function, they naturally disagree on the actual effects of these laws. On the right,
James P. Smith and Finis Welch argue that relative economic gains by blacks began well before the
passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and should be attributed not to the law but to improvements in
the quantity and quality of black education and to migration out of the South-that is, to market-based
processes. James P. Smith & Finis R. Welch, Black Economic Progress After Myrdal, 27 J. ECON.
LIT. 519, 528-47, 552-57 (1989). On the left, Richard Delgado and other critics have suggested that
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usually presumed to promote the hiring of those it is designed to protect.'
The logic underlying this presumption is simple: by making employers lia-
ble for failures to hire based on race (or other forbidden grounds), the law
raises the price of such discriminatory activity and produces less of it than
would occur if employers were left completely free to hire whomever they
wished.'
As Donohue and Siegelman and others have recognized, however,
there is a tension between protecting applicants against discrimination in
hiring and protecting workers from discriminatory firing after they have
been hired.7 Antidiscrimination law forbids both kinds of conduct, but the
two prohibitions are inherently at odds. By making it harder tofire certain
workers, employment discrimination law tends to make these workers less
the laws are little more than symbolic expressions of disapproval that make it easier for society to
ignore the pervasiveness of discrimination. See Richard Delgado, Recasting the American Race
Problem, 79 CAL. L. REv. 1389, 1397 (1991) (suggesting that the gains of the black middle class in
the wake of antidiscrimination legislation "may have ... contributed to white complacency and
tokenism"). For a balanced empirical assessment, see John J. Donohue In & James Heckman,
Continuous Versus Episodic Change: The Impact of Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status of
Blacks, 29 J. ECON. LIT. 1603-43 (1991) (suggesting that antidiscrimination laws have some effect,
although less than they did when Title V11 was first passed).
5. The notion of whom antidiscrimination law is designed to protect has broadened considerably
with the passage of time. While the original laws were clearly designed especially with African-
Americans in mind, the reach of the antidiscrimination principle now includes women, the disabled,
older workers, and others. See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101
(1994); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994). We concentrate on
race discrimination in this Paper, although some of our insights could easily be extended to discrim-
ination based on other attributes.
6. See, e.g., Donohue & Heckman, supra note 4, at 1638 (noting that employers commonly re-
spond to the threat of Title VII litigation with some remedial action in favor of minority workers);
William Landes, The Economics of FairEmploymentLaws, 76 J. POL. ECON. 507, 509 (1968) ("[T1he
passage of a fair employment law adds an expected cost to firms and unions that are violating either
the segregation or wage differential provision of the law, and induces a substitution away from
discriminatory behavior."); Stephen A. Plass, Arbitrating, Waiving and Deferring Title VII Claims,
BROOK. L. REV. 779, 825 (1992) (discussing the impact of arbitration on "the deterrence functions of
antidiscrimination laws"); Michael Selmi, Testing for-Equality: Merit Efficiency, and the Affirmative
Action Debate, 42 UCLA L. REv. 1251, 1298 (1995) ("The threat of lawsuits and potential liability
for damages are intended to deter employers from engaging in discriminatory behavior.").
7. John J. Donohue Ill & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1015-21, 1023-32 (1991). To our knowledge, Richard Posner was
the first to suggest the tradeoff between hiring and firing protection in the discrimination context,
although he did not explore it in depth. See Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title
VII, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 513, 519 (1987) (suggesting that Title Vn makes the hiring of black workers
more costly, but that the law has an even greater impact on the cost of firing black workers). Some
of the story seems to have been developed independently by Mayer Freed and Daniel Polsby in the
context of just cause firing protection. Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Just Cause for
Termination Rules and Economic Efficiency, 38 EMORY L.J. 1097, 1101-02 (1989) (suggesting that ten-
ure protection, a purchasable guarantee of job security in the absence of just cause, would allow
employers to offer lower salaries). The effects of firing costs on hiring behavior have been given con-
siderable attention in the economics literature under the rubric of dynamic labor demand. For a com-
prehensive recent survey, see DANIEL S. HAMERMESH, LABOR DEMAND 205-329 (1993).
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attractive prospects at the hiring stage. An employer would prefer to hire
someone who can be easily fired (should that prove necessary) than an
otherwise identical applicant whose firing would be subject to legal
scrutiny. Thus, protection against discriminatory firing acts as a kind of
tax on hiring those to whom it is extended.
While the tradeoff between "disparate treatment" hiring and firing
protection has already been described,8 this article extends the analysis to
the effects of "disparate impact" liability.9 Our major conclusion can be
put succinctly: far from producing hiring quotas that induce employers to
discriminate in favor of minorities, disparate impact liability may actually
induce hiring discrimination against minorities (and other protected
groups). Whether or not its net effect on minority employment is negative,
disparate impact firing liability almost certainly blunts the positive
incentives to hire minorities that Title VII was originally supposed to
create.
Our thesis contradicts the common wisdom that disparate impact
liability induces employers to hire "excessive" numbers of minorities. This
quota theory of disparate impact liability has a long and distinguished
pedigree. The Reagan administration sought to restrict disparate impact
liability because of "its pressure toward quotas;"' 0 George Bush vetoed
the 1990 Civil Rights Act because it was a "quota bill;"' and a plurality
of the Supreme Court in Watson y. Fort Worth Bank & Trust has enshrined
the quota theory in its parsing of Title VII:
Respondent and the United States are thus correct when they argue
that extending disparate impact analysis to subjective employment
practices has the potential to create a Hobson's choice for employers
8. See Donohue& Siegelman, supra note 7, at 1023-28; Posner, supra note 7, at 518-20.
9. Title VII jurisprudence has divided along two main paths. The first is traditional disparate
treatment analysis, in which plaintiffs allege that an employer explicitly or deliberately used race or
some other forbidden category in reaching an employment decision such as hiring, firing, or promotion.
E.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In a disparate impact claim, by contrast, plaintiffs challenge an em-
ployment practice that is not explicitly designed to disadvantagea protected group. A classic example
might be a requirement that job applicants have a high school diploma, which disqualifies more blacks
than whites, who have a higher graduation rate. E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971). Employers can avoid disparate impact liability if they can show that the challenged practice
is justified by business necessity. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15 (1977)
(noting that disparate impact claims "involve employment practices that are facially neutral in their
treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot
be justified by business necessity").
10. CHARLES FRIED, ORDER & LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION-A FIRSTHAND
ACCOUNT 119 (1991).
11. In vetoing the 1990 Civil Rights Act, President Bush claimed that the bill "employs a maze
of highly legalistic language to introduce the destructive forces of quotas into our national employment
system." Steven A. Holmes, President Vetoes Bill on Job Rights; Showdown is Set, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
23, 1990, at Al.
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and thus to lead in practice to perverse results. If quotas and
preferential treatment become the only cost-effective means of
avoiding expensive litigation and potentially catastrophic liability,
such measures will be widely adopted.2
Our thesis is that commentators have erred by only considering the effects
of disparate impact hiring liability. There are strong theoretical and
empirical reasons to believe that disparate impact firing liability is likely
to have a much greater impact on employer behavior, and that this effect,
far from inducing hiring quotas in favor of minorities, may induce hiring
discrimination against these traditionally disadvantaged groups.
Our argument is developed in three Parts. In Part II, we examine the
evolution of disparate impact law and the kinds of incentives it provides
employers. Since 1990, only about one out of four disparate impact deci-
sions involves hiring, 3 and it is now considerably easier to establish a
prima facie firing case than a hiring case. The reason is that the former
requires only a simple comparison of the percentage of minorities fired
with the percentage of minorities who are employed by the defendant. In
contrast, plaintiffs seeking to establish disparate impact in hiring have a
more difficult time establishing the relevant baseline because the Supreme
Court has rejected the use of general population statistics and requires
proof of the qualified applicant pool. 4 Accordingly, plaintiffs in dispa-
rate impact firing litigation can more easily prove a prima facie case and
survive a defendant's summary judgment motion.
Part III explores how employers might behave if the stylized facts of
Part II are indeed true. That is, assuming disparate impact in firing is
scrutinized more closely than disparate impact in hiring, how are employ-
ers likely to respond? Specifically, this Part solves a simple model of
probationary hiring, in which an employer screens heterogenous prospec-
tive employees, hires some for a probationary period, and retains only
those whose actual productivities are above the (fixed) wage. If one makes
the plausible assumption that black workers are more variable in their
productivity on the job than are whites, 5 the model predicts that blacks
will have higher firing rates in the absence of any law forbidding disparate
impact in firing.
When disparate impact liability constrains the employer to fire the
same proportion of whites and blacks, however, she will respond by hiring
12. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 993 (1988) (emphasis added).
13. See infra at subpart I(B).
14. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650-51 (1989) ("It is such a comparison-
between the racial composition of the qualified persons in the labor market and persons holding at-issue
jobs-that generally forms the proper basis for the initial inquiry in a disparate-impact case.").
15. For the reasoning behind this assumption, see infra notes 41 and 42 and accompanying text.
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fewer blacks and more whites than she otherwise would have. 6 By
making it harder to fire protected workers, disparate impact liability
discourages probationary employment generally, and might even lead em-
ployers to deliberately discriminate against protected workers at the hiring
stage. In this model, disparate impact liability does produce a quota effect,
but unlike the traditional theories, disparate impact liability induces a firing
quota with an inverse (anti-minority) quota at the hiring stage.
Our basic insight can also be put in other terms: probationary
employment offers employers the equivalent of a financial option on the
workers they hire. An employer's downside risk is limited because an
applicant who is hired and then turns out to produce less than the wage can
be discharged quickly, limiting losses to the probationary period. A
worker who is revealed to have high productivity can be retained for an
additional period, at the same fixed wage. This means that employer prof-
its are an increasing function of the variability of worker marginal product,
because variability increases upside potential without proportionately in-
creasing downside risk. Employers therefore have a preference for risk:
given two workers of equal expected productivity, a profit-maximizing em-
ployer will prefer the one whose productivity is more variable. This sug-
gests that probationary hiring is especially likely to work to the advantage
of black applicants, about whom employers may have more uncertainty.
Part IV of the Paper explores some normative implications of our
analysis. We suggest a range of policies that illuminate the tradeoff
between hiring and firing liability. None of our policy alternatives furthers
all the goals underlying disparate impact liability. Nevertheless, we
highlight some important factors that argue in favor of one or another of
the policies we describe.
II. The Evolution of Disparate Impact Litigation
A. The Increasing Difficulty of Establishing a Disparate Impact in Hiring
Early disparate impact cases had two important characteristics. They
were predominantly challenges to hiring practices, and they focused on rel-
atively objective practices such as "aptitude" tests, height or weight
requirements, drug testing, criminal record checks, or high school
graduation requirements.'
16. Of course, the employer alsofires fewer blacks (and more whites), and we will demonstrate
that disparate impact liability may increase the expected black wage bill-even as it reduces the amount
of entry level probationary hiring.
17. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 582-87 (1979) (concluding that the
transit authority's drug testing policy was job-related); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
425-26 (1975) (disallowing non-job-related aptitudetesting); Griggs v. DukePower Co., 401 U.S. 424,
433-36 (1971) (striking down a high school graduation requirement for the hiring of manual laborers).
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Over time, however, plaintiffs had increasing difficulty establishing
prima facie evidence of disparate impact in hiring for two reasons. First,
employers had an incentive to respond to the early hiring cases by aban-
doning testing and other objective practices in favor of subjective hiring
standards that are less likely to give rise to disparate impact liability.'"
Second, courts toughened the requirement for establishing the relevant
baseline against which disparities are to be assessed. Plaintiffs could no
longer use the proportion of minorities or women in the general population
as a benchmark. Instead of pointing to a simple population statistic, the
Supreme Court in Hazelwood and subsequent opinions required plaintiffs
to calculate the racial composition of "the qualified ... population in the
relevant labor market"' 9 or the "otherwise-qualified applicants. "'
In several respects, there are striking parallels between the evolution
of disparate treatment and disparate impact law and the responses to
each."' As Donohue and Siegelman have shown, early disparate treatment
cases were virtually all allegations of hiring discrimination.' Relatively
quickly, however, employers stopped engaging in obviously discriminatory
hiring practices; either they continued to discriminate but covered their
tracks, or they actually cleaned up their act. In the absence of an obvious
motive or a relevant comparison group, potential plaintiffs have a difficult
time recognizing that disparate treatment in hiring has occurred, let alone
convincing a court of that fact. Disparate treatment firing cases, however,
typically do offer plaintiffs a relevant and accessible comparison group-
other workers at the same firm who were not fired.
For an extended discussion, see Mark Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination in "General Ability" Job
Testing, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1157 (1991).
18. Even though subjective disparate impact claims are cognizable, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank
& Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 989-91 (1988), plaintiffs have an easier time establishing a prima facie case
when they can point to a specific obstacle such as a test or employment requirement that is generating
the disparity. This is because the Supreme Court requires plaintiffs to point to aparticular employment
practice which produces a disparate impact. See Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven L. Willbom,
Deconstructing Disparate Impact: A View of the Model Through New Lenses, 74 N.C. L. REV. 325,
346 (1996).
19. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977) (emphasis added). This
was a disparate treatment case, but the same principles apply to disparate impact suits.
20. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 585; Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 651 (1989).
21. Tightening the standards for defining the relevant population baseline increasingly blurs the
distinction between disparate impact and disparate treatment. In the extreme case, a disparate impact
plaintiff would have to show that minorities were disproportionately represented in the class of equally
qualified, but rejected candidates, where a showing of "equally qualified" would require a McDonnell
Douglas-like proof that the fired minorities were better qualified than the retained whites. In this
extreme case, if the plaintiff could not meet this burden, the defendant would argue that there was not
disproportionate firing, because minorities were a larger percentage of the most unproductive workers.
22. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 7, at 1015-16 (documenting a dramatic reversal over the
last 30 years from a predominance of hiring charges to an overwhelming majority of termination
charges).
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Much the same story can be told about disparate impact. In the early
post-Griggs era, plaintiffs had a relatively easy time mounting disparate
impact challenges to objective hiring practices such as tests and high school
graduation requirements. Over time, employers responded to the threat of
liability with defensive measures that made it harder for plaintiffs to devise
a disparate impact hiring suit that could survive a motion for summary
judgment. For example, it is relatively easy to substitute a subjective
interview for an aptitude test at the hiring stage. Employers also have
considerable latitude in defining the "qualified applicant pool" in such a
way that the alleged hiring disparity disappears.
Given the current state of the law, however, it appears to be much
harder for employers to avoid disparate impact in discharging workers.24
The racial composition of hired workers forms a clear baseline against
which disparities in firing rates can easily be compared. An employer
whose workforce is five percent black but whose fired workers are ten
percent black is thus likely to be an easy target for a disparate impact
suit.' This disparity constitutes powerful prima facie evidence that will
almost certainly survive a summary judgment motion by the defendant. By
contrast, an employer whose flow of newly hired workers is ten percent
black in an area where the population is fifteen percent black can always
argue that the "relevant" population (those who are qualified for and inter-
ested in the job under scrutiny) has a different racial composition from the
overall population.
In sum, just as with the history of disparate treatment, it has become
increasingly difficult for plaintiffs to prove a prima facie case of disparate
impact in hiring. 6  To the extent that employers today face a threat of
23. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,433-36 (1971) (striking down a high school gradu-
ation requirement for the hiring of manual laborers because it had a disparate impact on blacks).
24. Discharges might come en masse, as during a reduction in force, a plant closing, or a reeds-
sion-induced layoff. Alternatively, a series of individual-specific discharges can have a cumulative dis-
parate impact, even if race were not a factor in any of them.
25. See, e.g., Council 31 v. Ward, No. 87-C0356, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3040, at *1-2 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 28, 1995) (considering black workers' allegation of a disparate impact after a reduction in
force at a state agency). Even for firings by a single employer, however, there are still important ques-
tions about what constitutes the appropriate baseline. Is it the full-time workforce, or are part-time
workers included? Should all jobs be included, or only some? Which of the employer locations
(plants) should be included? And so on.
Under current law, an employer cannot avoid liability at the firing stage by her behavior at the
hiring stage. Consider an employer hiring from a pool that is 10% black, and suppose that her newly
hired workers and overall workforce are both 20% black. If the flow of fired workers over some
period is 30% black, plaintiffs will have a prima facie case of disparate impact in firing. An employer
who hires disproportionate numbers of blacks cannot use this "bottom line" defense against a charge
of disparate impact in firing. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 451 (1982). If any part of the em-
ployer's personnel practices has a disparate impact, considered on its own, then the whole employment
regime is subject to disparate impact liability.
26. Disparate impact and disparate treatment cases do differ in some important ways. Plaintiffs
who are fired for specific acts of (alleged) misbehavior are more likely to bring disparate treatment
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disparate impact liability, it will not be for failing to hire a quota of
minorities, but rather for firing a disproportionate number of those they
have already hired.
B. The Changing Nature of Disparate Impact Litigation: An Empirical
Assessment
This subpart attempts to quantify the number of disparate impact
hiring and firing cases brought in federal courts between 1971 and 1995. z2
If our analysis of the changing doctrine and circumstances is correct, we
would expect to see a shift in the composition of suits over time similar to
that observed by Donohue and Siegelman in the disparate treatment con-
text: hiring suits should fall and firing suits should increase.
Figure 1 plots the share of hiring and firing cases among all disparate
impact cases by year. These shares bounce around over time, so the figure
shows the data in smoothed form by plotting three-year moving averages.
The figure demonstrates that the relative importance of hiring cases among
all disparate impact cases has fallen substantially since the early 1970s; by
contrast, the proportion of firing cases has increased over this period.
Although the total number of cases in any given year is relatively small,
the overall trends are as predicted. The bottom line is that disparate impact
firing cases have outnumbered hiring cases in every year since 1986, and
since 1990, there have been almost three firing cases for every hiring case
filed.
suits. They have a psychological investment in clearing their names and an obvious reference group
(their retained coworkers) against which their own conduct can be compared to detect discrimination
on the part of the employer. The typical disparate impact firing suit seems more likely to be brought
by a group of workers, perhaps involving a plant closing, layoff, or other multiworker action by the
employer. Detecting disparities in firing (or hiring) rates is also different from detecting a bad motive
by the employer. The former inherently requires that plaintiffs or their attorneys look to aggregate
hiring or firing statistics, which are not available to potential plaintiffs in the ordinary course of events.
27. Our sample was generated from the Westlaw DCT (federal district court) database using the
following search request: "78I(B) & 'DISPARATE IMPACT' 'DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT'
'ADVERSE IMPACT' & DA(1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993
1995)." Under West's Key Number System, 78 is civil rights; I is rights protected and discrimination
prohibited; and B is employment practices.
This search produced 409 documents (as of 12/7/95); not all of them were disparate impact
cases, however. Any case in which a disparate impact claim was alleged, or where the court com-
mented or ruled on a disparate impact claim, was included in our analysis. We excluded those, for
example, which stated "this is not a disparate impact case," leaving us with 294 cases. The case year
was coded as either the year in which the incident complained of occurred, or the year in which the
case was filed.
Ideally, we would have liked to look at all filed cases, not just those that produced written
opinions and showed up on WESTLAW. In the absence of a written opinion, however, it is not possi-
ble to distinguish disparate impact from disparate treatment claims except by going back to the original
complaints. Such research is extremely costly because disparate impact cases are quite rare, and it
would require a major effort to uncover enough such cases to determine if there is any trend in their
composition. This and other methodological and interpretive problems are discussed at length below.
See infra text following note 29.
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Figure 1: Moving Average Shares of Hiring and Firing Opinions Among
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To further substantiate our claim that firings produce the most im-
portant form of disparate impact liability, we also calculated the proportion
of cases that plaintiffs won. (Winning was liberally defined to include any
decision in which the plaintiff preserved a right to go forward with his or
her case.) Overall we found that plaintiffs succeeded in 30.9% of the
disparate impact firing cases-which seems high enough to suggest that em-
ployers cannot simply ignore this increasingly important source of
liability.29
28. This definition would include surviving a defendant's motion to dismiss.
29. Because our definition of plaintiff success is broader than that used in other empirical studies,
we find a higher success rate. Cf., e.g., Peter Siegelman & John 1. Donohue I, The Selection of
Employment Discrimination Disputesfor Litigation: Using Business Cycle Effects to Test the Priest-Klein
Hypothesis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 427, 428, 434 fig. 1 (1995) (including as plaintiff wins only those
cases that are "ultimately adjudicated" with judgment in favor of the plaintiff).
We also checked to see whether the plaintiff win rate in firing cases was falling over time.
Given the relatively small number of cases and the substantial amount of noise, it was impossible to
discern an obvious trend in the win rate. Plaintiffs won roughly 39% of cases between 1970 and 1982,
- - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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While these results suggest that hiring liability is less of a threat to
employers than firing liability, they should be treated with caution for four
reasons. First, the data come from a selected sample: only those cases that
generate a written opinion are eligible for inclusion in WESTLAW. And
the decision to write an opinion is not random. 30  Non-random selection
is only a problem when the selection criterion (whether or not to publish)
is correlated with the variable(s) of interest (hiring versus firing case) as
they evolve over time, however. There is no reason to think that hiring
cases are differentially likely to generate written opinions over time in a
way that could bias our results. Nevertheless, we also attempted to investi-
gate the prevalence of hiring and firing disparate impact cases among un-
published cases, using a data set of some 1,200 unpublished employment
discrimination cases collected by the American Bar Foundation.3' Unfor-
tunately, the 1,200-case sample contained only six identifiable disparate
impact cases, so the data are essentially useless for these purposes.
A second caveat might be termed the "denominator problem." What
employers care about is the probability of suit conditional on the practice
being challenged. If firings are very common and hirings very rare, the
mere fact that there are more firing than hiring suits is not very meaning-
ful. Lacking data on the number of potential suit-generating incidents, it
is hard to say anything concrete about how disparate impact liability actual-
ly affects employers. It is inconceivable that the total volume of new
hiring has fallen substantially over the past twenty-five years, however,
which implies that the number of disparate impact hiring suits per person
hired has indeed fallen.
Third, the observed low proportion of hiring suits may be an
endogenous artifact of the very quota effect that we argue is not present.
Firms may have been so concerned about disparate impact hiring liability
that they adopted minority hiring quotas to avoid it. While theoretically
plausible, this explanation does not account for the high proportion of
firing suits.32 Moreover, the low participation rate of minorities in such
and roughly 30% of those between 1983 and 1994. This suggests that win rates may be falling over
time, but the win rate still seems high enough to warrant concern on the part of employers.
30. For an extensive discussion of the differences between published and unpublished employment
discrimination cases, see Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue Ill, Studying the Iceberg From Its Tip:
A Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases,.24 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 1133 (1990).
31. The cases were coded from the original complaints and other documents and were sampled
randomly from all filed employment discrimination cases in seven cities (New York, Philadelphia,
Atlanta, New Orleans, San Francisco, and Chicago). For a fuller description of the data, which are
available for public use, see Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 30.
32. If firing grows faster than hiring, and if all other factors (such as the labor force participation
rate) remain equal, then we would expect to see an increase in unemployment. Even if the overall vol-
ume of firing has increased, the denominator effect cannot account for the high proportion of firing
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a large number of job classifications is inconsistent with any widespread
quota effect.
Finally, there are problems of weighting. Most disparate treatment
suits are brought by individuals, and from an employer's point of view are
roughly similar in their effect on overall profits: we can be fairly sure that
the effect on employers is roughly proportional to the number of suits filed.
Disparate impact suits are much more heterogeneous, however. They may
be brought by individuals or plaintiff classes of varying sizes to challenge
a wide variety of practices and generate substantial or minimal litigation
expenses. The raw number of suits filed is therefore not as good an
indicator of the importance of disparate impact to employers as it would be
for disparate treatment suits.
C. Conclusion
As with disparate treatment, early disparate impact suits were largely
easy-to-win hiring cases. Once the disparate impact principle was articu-
lated, an almost mechanical application was sufficient to strike down a
whole host of hiring practices. These certain losses gave employers an
incentive to change their hiring practices in a variety of ways to avoid such
liability. Avoiding liability for disparate impact in firing, however, is
more difficult because of the baseline and subjectivity problems we dis-
cussed earlier.
The empirical evidence, limited though it is, does support our thesis.
Disparate impact hiring cases have become less common over time relative
to others, while disparate impact firing cases have become more frequent,
in a strong parallel with the evolution of disparate treatment cases. As a
result, disparate impact firing suits are now more numerous than hiring
suits by a substantial margin.
Our conclusion is that rational employers have more to fear from
racial disparities in firing than in hiring. Although an irrational fear of
hiring liability could still force employers to react by hiring quotas of
minorities,' we attribute rational expectations to employers (at least in the
suits unless we assume that employers respond to (the fear of) hiring liability by adopting quotas while
maintaining practices that would also give rise to disparate impact liability. This requires employers
to be misinformed or irrational. While both are of course possible, neither is likely over the long run.
33. For evidence of the low minority participation rate, see James E. Jones, The Genesis and
Present Status of Affrmative Action in Employment, 70 IOWA L. REv. 901, 917 (1985) (tabulating data
of the occupational distribution and penetration rates of nonwhite and female workers in various job
classifications).
34. There is evidence that during the debates around the 1991 Civil Rights Act (and in recent de-
bates after the Adarand decision), at least some larger businesses lobbied for continuation of their abil-
ity to engage in affirmative action, perhaps as a way to retain hiring quotas that exempted them from
disparate impact (hiring) liability. See, e.g., Fred Barnes, White House Watch: Last Laugh, NEW
REPUBLIC, Dec. 16, 1991, at 9, 10 (saying of a particular provision in the 1991 Civil Rights Act that
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long run).35 Accordingly, the next Part models disparate impact liability
as a constraint on employers' ability to fire workers.
III. The Effects of Disparate Impact Firing Liability in a Simple
Probationary Employment Model
A. An Overiew of the Model
The actors in our model are a risk-neutral employer and two groups
of workers of different races (black and white) with heterogeneous produc-
tivities. An extensive form representation of the timing of events in the
model is depicted in Figure 2. In period zero, before the game starts,
"Nature" (N) determines each worker's productivity. In the first period,
the employer (E) forms an estimate of each applicant's productivity, com-
pares it to the wage-which is fixed for all workers-and decides which ap-
plicants to hire. 6 In the second period, the employer (E) learns the true
value of the worker's productivity, and either fires the worker or retains
her for an additional period at the constant wage. By assumption, there are
no costs to monitoring worker productivity, and there is no discounting.
Workers are assumed to have no alternative occupation (except unemploy-
ment at a wage of zero), which means that the employer's offers will
always be accepted.37 The model thus depicts a stylized form of proba-
tionary employment, in which the worker is retained or fired depending on
her productivity during an initial screening period. While we have chosen
this model to highlight the influence of disparate impact liability on
probationary employment, our general conclusion-that disparate impact
firing liability could induce discrimination against minorities in hiring-
would emerge from any labor demand model."a
"business lobbyists opposed it. They thought it might make corporate affirmative action programs...
illegal").
35. If anything, employers seem to have an irrationally exaggerated fear of (wrongful discharge)
firing liability. See Lauren B. Edelman et al., Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat
of Wrongful Discharge, 26 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 47 (1992).
36. The fixed-wage assumption may strike some readers as odd, but it is necessary in any model
that is capable of predicting that some workers will be fired. In a world with completely flexible
wages, an employer would simply lower the wage for any worker until it was no greater than her con-
tribution to his profits (marginal revenue product), at which point he would always be willing to retain
her for an additional period. For a clear discussion of the importance of the "suppression of
renegotiation" in employment contracts, see Robert E. Hall, Lost Jobs, [1995] 1 BROOMINOS PAPERS
ON ECON. AcTIvITY 221 (1995).
37. While this assumption may seem controversial, the wage paid by the probationary employer
can be interpreted without loss of generality as being simply a premium over the workers' next best
wage opportunity.
38. See HAMERMESH, supra note 7, at 302 (noting that "both hiring and layoff costs impose a
wedge between a potential new hire's marginal product and wage rate," thus reducing hiring (emphasis
in original)).
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Figure 2: Game Tree for Probationary Hiring Model
(Employer's, Worker's Payoffs)
No MP, E E Hire E2 Retain (2(MP + E - w), 0)
(0,0) (MP - E -w, w)
In our model, a worker's productivity on the job is the sum of two
components, a known marginal productivity, MP, and an uncertain element
e. MP is observable to both the applicant and employer before hiring; E is,
however, not known by either player unless the worker is actually hired.
However, the employer can observe the absolute value of e before a hiring
decision is made.39 In other words, the decision to hire is made on the
basis of MP + I E l, while the decision to fire or retain is made on the basis
of MP + E, where the realized value of E is equally likely to be ± I eI.
This highly stylized characterization of uncertainty means that only the sign
of e is unknown before the worker is hired. As there is an equal
probability (PR) of E being positive or negative (PR(E = + IEl) =
PR(E - I EI) = ), it follows that the expected value (E) of E is zero
(E(e) = 0) and that the expected value of MP will be unchanged
(E(MP + E) = MP). In this stylized example, we also assume equal
numbers of black and white applicants.
We assume separate and independent distributions for both MP and E,
for blacks and for whites. In order to simplify both exposition and calcu-
lation, all parameters are taken to follow uniform distributions. Specif-
ically, the observable marginal productivity component of whites is dis-
tributed uniformly over a range from 0 to 100, and that of blacks over a
range from 0 to 75. Whites' I EI varies uniformly between 0 and 5, and
that of blacks between 0 and 62/3. (MPw - U[0,100], MPb - U[0,75],
IewI - U[0,5], and I EbI - U[0,20/3], where w and b subscripts refer to
39. For completeness, we assume that the employee knows everything the employer does as soon
as the employer knows it. But nothing in our model turns on the employee's knowledge because the
employer makes all the decisions.
There are other models of probationary employment in which an information asymmetry between
workers and employers plays a crucial role. For example, Eng Seng Loh hypothesizes that workers
know their own productivity and propensity to quit better than employers do. Eng Seng Loh,
Employment Probation as a Sorting Mechanism, 47 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 471, 485 (1994).
Employers who need better workers offer higher wages and a probationary period, inducing applicants
to self-select. The model is tested and confirmed using data from a nationwide employer survey.
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whites and blacks, respectively.) Blacks therefore come from a population
with lower mean productivity and greater uncertainty than whites.' Our
assumption that black applicants have a lower mean productivity is contro-
versial 41 but not strictly necessary because a greater variance in e is, by
itself, sufficient to generate higher black firing rates. This greater black
variance might plausibly be explained by two factors: First, affirmative
action in education means that any given level of achievement is a less
precise signal for blacks than it is for whites. Second, since most em-
ployers are likely to be white, they may be unfamiliar with the relationship
between qualifications and performance for minority job applicants.4'
B. Solving the Model: The Unconstrained Case
A solution to the employer's problem takes the form of two optimal
decision rules specifying which workers to hire, and of those hired, which
to fire. To derive such a solution, we use the standard technique of
solving backwards. In the last period, the employer must decide which
workers to retain and which to fire in order to maximize his profits. Since
the decision to fire or retain takes place after the first period, there is no
longer any uncertainty about e. We can therefore express the employer's
profit (7r) from any given worker i at a given wage w as:
Iri = (MPi + 6) - W.
Clearly, the employer should keep all workers for whom 7r > 0 (or
MP + E > w), and fire the rest.43 Knowing this optimal second-period
firing policy, which applicants should the employer decide to hire in the
first period? Consider an applicant with an observable MP and I E I; the
employer knows that if hired, this applicant is equally likely to have a
productivity of MP + I eI or MP - I EI. It is obvious that anyone for
whom MP + I e I < w should never be hired, since even in the best case,
such an applicant will produce less than she costs the employer. Similarly,
40. The amount of information that employers learn about applicants after they have been hired
(as opposed to the information available before hiring) can be measured by the relative sizes of the
expected values of Ie and MP. For whites, this value is [(5-0)12]/[(100-0)12] = 5 %. For blacks, it
is [(2013-0)12]/[(75-0)12] = 8.8%. Black productivities are thus more uncertain than whites, in that
an employer learns more about the average black worker than about the average white worker after
hiring.
41. One legacy of past and continuing discrimination is that minority job applicants may have had
impaired opportunities to acquire human capital and hence have a lower expected mean productivity.
42. For a survey and analysis of employer attitudes towards race, see Joleen Kirschennan &
Katherine M. Neckerman, "We'dLove to Hire Them, But... ': The Meaning of Race for Employers,
in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 203, 231 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991) (finding that
white employers rely heavily on stereotypes in assessing the qualifications of black applicants and use
a variety of heuristics-of unknown reliability-to distinguish between "good" and "bad" applicants).
43. Any profit or loss incurred in the first period is regarded as a sunk cost by the second period,
and thus does not enter into the employer's second period calculations.
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any applicant for whom MP - I e > w should obviously be hired-even
in the worst case, this applicant will earn the employer a positive profit,
and can be retained for the second period. For those applicants with
intermediate values of (MP + I e I), the employer's decision is somewhat
more complicated. If, after hiring, the worker turns out to have a positive
realization of e, then the employer will earn positive profits and will want
to keep the worker for an additional period. If the worker turns out to
have a negative realization of e, however, the employer will earn negative
profits, but only for one period, as the worker can be terminated at the end
of the probationary period. It is this ability to fire after the first period if
the worker turns out to have an unfavorable realization of e (and to retain
the worker for an additional period if e turns out to be positive) that drives
the probationary hiring decision.
The optimal first period hiring rule can thus be derived by simply
noting that the employer should hire all applicants with a positive expected
profit, given optimal firing behavior in the second period.' The em-
ployer has the option of firing employees who turn out to have low produc-
tivities (e < 0); this means the employer should hire anyone if the ex-
pected profit from two good periods (if e > 0) is greater than the expected
loss from one bad period (if E < 0). In algebraic terms, this translates
into hiring anyone for whom MP > w - IJ I / 3.1 For example, this
rule implies that with a fixed wage of 50, the employer should be willing
to hire an applicant with MP = 48 and I e I = 7. Even though this appli-
cant has a one-period expected output (48) that is less than the wage, the
employer would expect to earn half a dollar profit from such an employee,
because the employer has an equal (50%) chance of a single-period loss of
(48 - 7 - 50) = -9 and a two-period gain of [2 x (48 + 7 - 50)] = 10.
Figure 3 depicts our analysis graphically. As derived above, the
hiring line has a slope of -1/3. It represents those combinations of e and MP
44. Note the important difference between optimal and naive behavior. The naive profit
maximization rule would be to hire those for whom E(MP + I e 1) > w; this is equivalent to MP >
w, since E( e 1) = 0. The distinction between optimal and naive behavior highlights the option value
of probationary employment, an idea we discuss further below. This insight has by now been utilized
in a variety of economic contexts. See, e.g., Bradford Cornell, The Incentive to Sue: An Option-
Pricing Approach, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 173 (1990); Robert S. Pindyck, Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and
Investment, 29 J. ECON. Lrr. 1110, 1113-42 (1991); Martin L. Weitzman, Sequential R&D Strategy
for Synfuels, 12 BELL J. ECON. 574, 582-88 (1981).
45. Letting "Good" denote the condition e > 0, and "Bad" the condition e < 0, we can write the
employer's two-period expected profits for applicant i as:
E(7r,(MP, I ejl, w)) = PR(Good) X(Length of Employment if Good) x( Profit per period if Good) +
PR(Bad) x (Length of Employment if Bad) x ( Profit per period if Bad).
Substituting in the appropriate values yields:
E(7.)-=1h X2 x[MP+ lel - w] + h X 1 X [MP - ledl - w].
After some simple algebra, we then have:
E(ir1) = 312[MP, + Ili1/3 - W].
Hence, E(7r.i will be positive whenever MPI > I e 113 - w.
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for which the employer can expect to earn zero profits under optimal
behavior. Applicants with (MP, I 1) combinations below the line are not
hired, while those above the line are.
Figure 3: Unconstrained Hiring and Probationary Lines, for Both Races
Bounds for White Distributions88 ---------------------------------
Hired Set Bounds for BlackDistributions
66-
0





0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
lepsilon
Probationary Line- - Hiring Line
The probationary line divides those initially hired into two groups:'
employees above the line will have such high MPs that they will be re-
tained (rehired in the second period) even if their e turns out to be nega-
tive-we refer to these as the "Set" workers; those below this line are the
true probationary hires, because they will be fired after the first period if
the employer learns that their e is negative.
Table 1 presents a numerical illustration of the model for the
hypothetical parameter values listed earlier. The Table describes equilibria
both with and without the disparate impact firing constraint.4 7 For the
moment, we focus on the unconstrained equilibrium in column 1.
46. The line has a slope of 1 and an intercept of w = 50 because this represents the group of
employees that the employer would be just willing to rehire even if the realized value of e is negative.
For example, an employee with MP = 60 and I = 10 would still produce a non-negative profit
(60 - 10 - 50) even if there is an unfavorable realization of e.
47. See infra subpart 1II(C).
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Table 1: The Effect of Disparate Impact Firing Liability on Employer
Hiring and Firing Decisions
Employer
Unconstrained BehaviorConstrainedBehavior By Disparate
Impact Firing
Liability
% of White Applicants who are Hired 50.83% 51.29%
% of White who are Hired-Set 47.50% 46.50%
% of White who are Hired-Probation 3.33% 4.39%
% of White who are Hired-Doomed 0.00% 0.39%
% of Black Applicants who are Hired 34.81% 34.23%
% of Black who are Hired-Set 28.89% 30.77%
% of Black who are Hired-Probation 5.93% 3.46%
% of Black who are Hired-Doomed 0.00% 0.00%
% of Hired who are Black 40.65% 40.03%
% of Fired who are Black 64.00% 40.03%
% of Hired Whites who are fired 3.28% 5.05%
% of Hired Blacks who are fired 8.51% 5.05%
Expected Periods of Employment for Whites* 1.0000 0.9998
Expected Periods of Employment for Blacks* 0.6667 0.6673
Expected Wage Bill For Whites* 50 49.9875
Expected Wage Bill For Blacks* 33.3375 33.365
Expected Employer Profits 33.427 33.4127
Hired-Set = Hires with a 100% probability of being retained
Hired-Probation = Hires with a 50% probability of being retained
Hired-Doomed = Hires with a 0% probability of being retained
* Includes applicants who are not hired.
Given our assumption that whites' productivity has a lower variance and
a higher mean, white applicants are more likely to be hired initially:
although the labor force is 50% black, the hired workforce is only 40.6%
black. Among those fired, however, blacks constitute a disproportionately
large share, amounting to 64%. The reason for this disparity lies in the
greater uncertainty surrounding black productivities. Since the typical
black worker has a higher value of I e I, she is more likely to be hired on
probation, and hence more likely to be fired.
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C. Solving the Model: The Constrained Case
Until now, we have modeled behavior as if it were not subject to any
employment discrimination law. For reasons discussed earlier, we propose
that disparate impact liability can best be thought of as a constraint on
employerfiring behavior that nevertheless leaves the employer considerable
leeway in making hiring decisions.48 To highlight the effects of disparate
impact firing liability, we model disparate impact law as a restriction
whose only effect is to forbid employers from disproportionately firing
their minority workers. That is, if an employer's workforce is X% black,
then her fired workers must also be no more than X% black.49 Put in the
simplest possible terms, we are assuming that disparate impact liability
requires employers to adopt minority firing quotas. The unconstrained
equilibrium in our numeric example violates this mandate, because blacks
made up 40.7% of the initial workforce, but 64% of those fired. Our goal
in this subpart is to explore how rational employers would respond to the
imposition of such a firing quota.
To abstract away from problems of enforcement, we assume the law
to be absolutely binding and examine how an employer would go about
complying with the legal constraint.' The mathematics of this problem
turn out to be complicated, without being particularly interesting. We
therefore relegate the details to the Appendix and provide only a simple
exposition here.5' Figures 4 and 5 graph the optimal (profit-maximizing)
48. As Daniel Hamermesh points out, any restriction on employers' flexibility to adjust their labor
force will generate a reduction in labor demand at the hiring stage. HAMERMESH, supra note 7, at 329-
30. While our model looks different from the standard description of dynamic labor demand, we chose
this specific model so that we could explicitly consider probationary employment, a widespread practice
that, we argue, is likely to be of special benefit to minorities. By analogy, the same kind of model
could also apply to a firm considering whether to open a plant in an inner-city enterprise zone (where
the expected costs are lower but more variable) or in the predominantly white Iowa countryside. An
Iowa plant can be closed without fear of disparate impact liability, whereas one in an enterprise zone
cannot; this works to the disadvantage of the enterprise zone. We are grateful to Henry Hansmann for
this suggestion.
49. Since the racial makeup of the current workforce is a stock measure and the fired workers are
a flow (per unit of time), the constraint, to be realistic, should also specify the unit of time over which
the racial firing rates must be equal. We finesse this problem in our simple two-period model. The
absence of any constraint at all on hiring is an extreme assumption which we make purely to simplify
the exposition. Our results would not change qualitatively if employers faced some mild hiring con-
straint in addition to the strict firing constraint we hypothesize.
50. Because we are interested in long-run behavior, we ignore the intermediate case in which an
employer with an existing workforce must decide how many of each type of workers to fire. The
Appendix demonstrates that this intermediate case-in which the employer's labor force is already given
and the only flexibility comes in adjusting firing rates-yields (I) greater adjustments in firing, and (2)
lower profits than are obtained if the employer is allowed to adjust both hiring and firing decisions
simultaneously, as seems reasonable.
51. If small numbers of applicants are being hired, then a profit-maximizing firm may face a
complicated integer optimization problem. To simplify the analysis, therefore, we assume that the firm
hires sufficiently large numbers of black and white applicants so that the integer problem does not arise.
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hiring and firing rules for blacks and whites, subject to the constraint that
the employer must fire the same percentage of blacks and whites.
These figures show that an employer constrained by disparate impact
firing liability will change her hiring and firing rules for both types of
workers. To comply with the equal firing rates mandate, the employer ex-
pands her probationary hiring of whites while decreasing her probationary
hiring of blacks.






0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
lepsiloni
- - Probationary Line, Unconstrained --- Hiring Line, Unconstrained
Probationary Line, Constrained m Hiring Line, Constrained
Figure 4 shows that probationary firing for blacks decreases in two
ways: First, the employer shifts up her hiring line, which means that she
will hire fewer blacks in the first place. Probationary hiring is generally
valuable to employers because they have the option of firing employees
who turn out to have low productivity. But the civil rights constraint
reduces the employer's ability to exercise this option, so that some black
employees who would have been hireable in a world without disparate im-
pact firing liability are no longer worth hiring. The civil rights constraint
has a second effect as well. Employers will also respond to the law by
shifting down their probationary line. This increases the set of black
workers who will be retained even if their e turns out to be negative. To
comply with the law, employers are even willing to retain some employees
whose known productivity is less than the wage, because retaining these
Texas Law Review
employees will allow the firm to fire even less productive blacks and to
retain more productive whites.
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Figure 5 shows how firms change their hiring and firing decisions to
increase the probationary hiring of whites. Initially, the firm lowers its
hiring line to increase the number of white workers who are hired on pro-
bation. But the firm also changes its firing rules to comply with the civil
rights constraint. The firm raises the probationary line, which increases
the number of white employees who will be fired if their e turns out to be
negative. Figure 5 also shows that the constraint creates a new class of
workers: the firm will hire some white workers merely so that they can be
fired to help satisfy the civil rights constraint, even if these workers turn
out have positive Es. Figure 5 and Table 1 refer to these workers as the
"Doomed" because they have zero probability of being retained. Hiring
whites who are certain to be fired helps satisfy the disparate impact
constraint by raising the white firing rate,52 and thus gives the firm more
52. As a matter of algebra, as long as fewer whites are fired than are hired, hiring a white worker
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discretion to fire more unproductive black workers. All of these changes
mean that the firm will be willing to fire white workers who turn out to
have a known productivity higher than the wage,53 because firing these
white workers will allow the firm to fire more unproductive black workers
and to retain even more productive white workers.
As noted earlier, Table 1 provides a numeric comparison of the
constrained and unconstrained results for blacks and whites. The civil
rights constraint forces the probability of being fired for blacks to equal the
probability of being fired for whites (both are 5.05%), which implies that
blacks make up the same proportion of hires as they do of fires (both are
40.03%). As expected, the civil rights constraint lowers the firm's
expected profits (from 33.427 to 33.413).
What are the effects on black and white workers? The central result
of the model is that disparate impact firing liability can induce disparate
treatment against blacks in hiring. Firms responded to the constraint by
hiring fewer blacks and by hiring more whites. The disparate shifts in the
hiring lines in Figures 4 and 5 mean that similarly situated applicants will
be treated differently because of their race. Specifically, blacks will be
worse off at the hiring stage. But the model also suggests that disparate
impact firing liability induces disparate treatment in favor of blacks in
retention.
The changes in the firm's hiring and firing decisions mean that some
blacks will benefit from the constraint while others will suffer. As shown
in Table 1, the civil rights constraint reduces the proportion of black
applicants who will be hired (from 34.81% to 34.23 %), but those who are
hired have a slightly higher probability of being retained for two periods.
In general, it is impossible to know which effect dominates: in our exam-
ple, the firing constraint increases the expected number of periods that an
average black applicant will be employed (from 0.6667 to 0.6673), but for
other parameter values the disemployment effect could outweigh the reten-
tion effect.
The constraint also has varying effects on white welfare. Somewhat
surprisingly, disparate impact firing liability helps some white applicants
by causing them to be hired when they would not be in the unconstrained
equilibrium. It disadvantages other whites by increasing the probability
that they will be fired. These effects are seen in Table 1: the constraint
increases the percentage of white applicants who are hired (from 50.83%
to 51.29%), but reduces marginally their expected length of employment
(from 1.0000 to 0.9998 periods).
53. This possibility can be seen graphically in Figure 5 from the fact that the "Doomed" region
includes an employee with MP = 51 and e = 0. Since the wage is 50, this is a worker who will
clearly yield positive profits for two periods, if retained.
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D. Some Cautions and Additional Evidence
1. Empirical Evidence on Firing Rates.-The model analyzed above
predicts a relatively small effect of firing liability on the hiring decision.
For example, imposition of the equal firing rates constraint lowers the pro-
portion of blacks hired by only about 1.7% (from 34.81% to 34.23 %).54
Thus, it is reasonable to ask whether disparate impact firing liability is
actually a serious problem for employers. It is impossible to answer this
question directly, but we suggest that the answer is "yes," for four reasons.
First, the magnitude of all of the effects in our model depends
'crucially on the highly unrealistic simplifying assumptions we made. We
could have generated larger effects with different distributional and para-
metric assumptions.
Second, it is clear that if workers are only rarely fired, employers will
not need to worry about firing liability at the time they make hiring deci-
sions. But the best evidence suggests that a typical employer can expect
to terminate roughly eight percent of her workforce each year in a manner
that might give rise to disparate impact liability.'
Third, the evidence from Europe-where there has been more substan-
tial experience with job security laws-suggests that firing costs do influ-
ence hiring behavior. Daniel Hamermesh summarizes the body of work
on this subject as follows:
Nearly all of the evidence shows that employment responds
more rapidly to output or cost shocks in North America than
elsewhere [Europe or Japan].
There are many easy explanations of why employment demand
reacts more rapidly in North America than elsewhere. The lack of
restrictive laws and penalties against rapid dismissals is a common
explanation .... 56
54. Similarly, in their "back-of-the-envelope" calculations, Donohue and Siegelman suggested that
the hiring effect of disparate treatment firing liability should be quite small. See Donohue &
Siegelman, supra note 7, at 1024, 1023-28 (proposing that "antidiscrimination laws may actually
provide employers with a (small) net disincentive to hire women and minorities").
55. Gross turnover in the labor market is exaggerated because there are lots of very short term
jobs. Ignoring these, Hall estimates that about 8-10% of workers separate from their employers each
quarter: about 2-2.5% are quits and 2-2.5% are temporary layoffs. "Probably around 4 percent of
workers Iosejobs permanently each quarter. Something like half of these permanent, involuntary losses
are sufficiently burdensome that a worker will identify the experience retrospectively as a
displacement." Hall, supra note 36, at 236, 235-36.
56. HAMERMESH, supra note 7, at 273 (footnote omitted). One exception to this general body of
work is Giuseppe Bertola and Samuel Bentolila, who find small effects of firing regulation on hiring
in their elaborate dynamic model of employment with hiring and firing costs. Using "realistic
parameters" to calibrate their model, they find that "firing costs do not have large effects on hiring
decisions, nor do high firing costs reduce the average level of employment .... these results [are
explained] by the role of discounting and labor attrition in the firm's dynamic optimization problem."
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Finally, probationary employment regimes such as the one we
describe-in which applicants are hired, evaluated for a relatively brief
period, and discharged if their productivities turn out to be lower than the
wage-appear to be quite common. Evidence on the prevalence of proba-
tionary employment comes from two studies. Harry Holzer uses data from
a large Employment Opportunity Pilot Program (EOPP) survey.' He
finds that sixty-four percent of the firms surveyed used probationary
employment."8 Groshen and Loh used the EOPP and two other data
sets.5 9 They find that seventy-two percent of firms in the EOPP sample
had a "formal" probationary period.' Surveys by the Conference Board
and the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland find seventy-six and sixty
percent, respectively, of firms using probationary hiring.6"
The possibility of future firing thus seems large enough to cast a
shadow on the hiring decision, although the exact size of this effect is an
empirical question. We are confident that disparate impact liability is more
likely to constrain employers' firing decisions than their hiring decisions-
hence our conclusion that firing quotas are much more likely than hiring
quotas. But there remains a possibility that neither type of legal liability
is salient enough to change employer behavior. While our analysis of the
law and of the available evidence suggests that disparate impact firing
liability is more salient than hiring liability, the threat of firing liability
Samuel Bentolila & Giuseppe Bertola, Firing Costs and Labour Demand: How Bad is Eurosclerosis?,
57 REV. ECON. STUD. 381, 381-82 (1990) (emphasis in original). However, the discounting and
voluntary turnover assumptions of this model seem less appropriate when studying probationary
employment.
57. Harry J. Holzer, Hiring Procedures in the Firm: Their EconomicDeterminants and Outcomes,
in HUMAN RESOURCES AND THE PERFORMANCE OF THE FIRM 243,254, 257 tab. 1 (Morris M. Kleiner
et al. eds., 1987).
58. Id. at 257 tab. 1. Among his other findings were that the prevalence of probationary employ-
ment varied across two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, with construction and
mining least likely to use it and manufacturing most likely. Id. at 262 tab. 3. Firms with more appli-
cants per opening and more hours of on-the-job training were also more likely to employ probationary
periods. Unions, education level, and wage levels were unrelated to the use of probationary employ-
ment. Overall, the explanatory power of Holzer's regressions were low: the R2 was only 0.038. Id.
59. Erica L. Groshen & Eng Seng Loh, What Do We Know About Probationary Periods?, in
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION SERIES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-FIFTH ANNUAL
MEETING 10 (John F. Burton, Jr. ed., 1993).
60. Id. at 15 tab. 1. The difference between the two findings appears to be that Holzer weights
firms by their employment, while Groshen and Loh do not. Compare Holzer, supra note 57, at 263
with Groshen & Loh, supra, at 15.
61. The authors point out a major problem with the survey data: firms with "infinite probation"-
for example, those in which workers are subject to dismissal at will-are indistinguishable in these data
from those with no probation at all. Among their other findings are these:
Of those firms with probationary periods, the median length was about 10 weeks in the EOPP
study and about 20 weeks in the Cleveland Fed study. Higher wages tend to be linked to longer proba-
tionary periods. Half of firms in the Fed study say that dismissal standards are lower during probation,
and 84% say that the reason for probation is to identify and fire unsatisfactory workers. Larger firms
seem less likely to use probationary periods. Groshen & Loh, supra note 59, at 15 (Table 1:
Characteristics of Employment Probationary Periods in Three Data Sets).
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may not be sufficient to induce the perverse hiring behavior outlined in our
model.62
IV. Policy Recommendations
A. Firing Liability Does Not Further the Traditional Justifications for
Disparate Impact
Part II of this Paper suggested that, in practice, disparate impact
liability tends to be invoked by plaintiffs largely to challenge employers'
firing decisions. Part III demonstrated the plausible consequences of this
pattern of enforcement: employers responding to a disparate impact firing
constraint will fire fewer blacks (and more whites), but will also hire fewer
blacks (and more whites) as well. This Part now takes up the difficult
question of what, if anything, we ought to do about the situation we have
just described.
We begin by inquiring about the theoretical justifications for disparate
impact liability.63 What is disparate impact law supposed to do; and if it
works as we have just described it, how compatible is disparate impact
with these objectives? The second half of this Part then takes up the
question of how we might refocus the law of disparate impact so as to
better achieve these goals.
For our purposes, it is convenient to think of two broad classes of
justifications for disparate impact liability. The first sees it as a way of
improving the economic opportunities of traditionally disadvantaged
groups. The second sees it as a deterrent to disparate treatment, to be used
as a supplement to the traditional attack on intentional discrimination when
the latter is too difficult to prove.
62. While the data on firing patterns by race are extremely skimpy, we do have compelling evi-
dence of disparate impact (and possibly disparate treatment) in the probationary employment practices
of one large employer. Craig Zwerling and Hillary Silver examined the complete employment records
of 2141 newly hired workers at the U.S. Postal Service in a large Eastern city over a three-year period.
Craig Zwerling & Hillary Silver, Race and Job Dismissals in a Federal Bureaucracy, 57 AM. Soc.
REV. 651, 653 (1992). They found dramatically higher firing rates for blacks than for whites, control-
ling for a variety of worker characteristics. Id. at 657-58. An outside consultant hired by the authors
reviewed the personnel file of each of the fired workers (with the worker's race deleted), and concluded
that all of the firings appeared to be "justified." Id. at 658. This pattern is consistent with the kind
of probationary employment regime we model-especially because the racial disparity gave rise to a
disparate impact claim.
63. While some of these rationales may be more persuasive than others on jurisprudential grounds,
we finesse such issues here. Thus, we ignore questions about which, if any, of the justifications best
approximates the intent of Congress, or helps explain the disparate impact decisions of the Supreme
Court, or is philosophically most sound. Our goal is simply to make suggestions of the form "if you
believe X, then the appropriate thing to do is Y." For extended treatments of the philosophical under-
pinnings of disparate impact, see EPSrEIN, supra note 3, at 182-241; Larry Alexander, What Makes
Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
149,212-16 (1992); Owen M. Fiss, A Theory ofFairEmploymentLaws, 38 U. Ct. L. REV. 235,236-
49, 281-313 (1971).
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1. Enhancing Minority Economic Outcomes.-According to this view,
disparate impact liability can be justified because the purpose of Title VII
is either to ensure proportionate distribution of economic resources among
groups or to remedy past discrimination. ' For our purposes, the distinc-
tion between disparate impact as a forward-looking means of achieving a
fairer division of the employment benefits controlled by employers or as
a backward-looking remedy for past discrimination against a group is not
particularly important. Under either principle, the goal of disparate impact
liability is to enhance minority employment outcomes.
Does disparate impact, as we have described it, contribute to a more
equal division of resources between blacks and whites? The answer is a
qualified "no." As we have seen, Table 1 compares the equilibria with
and without the disparate impact firing constraint. In particular, rows 9
and 10 show the expected wage bill, by race, with and without disparate
impact.' The table reveals that disparate impact liability can lower the
total earnings of whites (including both those who are unemployed and
those who hold a job), but can increase the total earnings of blacks.'
The reason is that although more whites are hired, more are also fired, so
that the expected length of employment falls (row 7) when firms are sub-
ject to the disparate impact firing constraint. The reverse is true for
blacks: fewer are hired when disparate impact firing liability constrains
employers, but the expected length of employment increases by more than
the hiring rate falls, leading to an increase in earnings for blacks as a
group.67
Our analysis therefore suggests that disparate impact firing liability
does reduce average inequality between black and white workers. But it
does so at the cost of increasing inequality within the black community.
As a result of disparate impact firing liability, fewer blacks are hired, but
those who do find a job can expect to be employed for longer, and thus to
64. This rationale for disparate impact would seem to be independent of whether one believed that
the observed differences in group achievement were due to discrimination or other causes. On this
view, Title VII (or at least disparate impact) is evidently to be thought of as a general inequality-
reduction mechanism.
65. The expected wage bill for whites is calculated as:
PR(Not Hired) x wm i + PR(Hired for 2 Periods - SET) x w X 2 +
PR( Hired for 1 Period - DOOMED) x w + PR(Hired-PROBATIONARY) x w x 1.5,
where the first term of this equation, PR(Not Hired) x w. , will of course always be zero.
The calculation for blacks is structurally similar. We normalize by assigning a wage of zero to
those who are not hired in the regulated sector and a wage of 50 to those who are hired. The relevant
probabilities are given in Table 1.
66. The effects are small-a 0.2% decrease for whites and a 0.08% increase for blacks-but this
is in large part attributable to the specific (and unrealistic) parametric assumptions we made.
67. By looking only at the wage bill, we implicitly ignore any effects on employers. We know
that profitability is lower as a result of the imposition of the disparate impact firing constraint; but if
most employers are white, we do not change any of our results by ignoring them.
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have higher earnings. While average black earnings are higher under the
disparate impact regime, the variance of earnings is also larger. If they are
risk neutral and have to vote before they know anything about what their
productivity will turn out to be, blacks should prefer the disparate impact
regime. But if they are sufficiently risk averse, blacks will prefer the
unconstrained equilibrium. 8 Put another way, if we care about differ-
ences in average utility rather than average earnings, disparate impact firing
liability may exacerbate black-white differences, rather than lessening
them.6 9
If disparate impact liability turns out in practice to be firing liability,
and if blacks are sufficiently risk neutral, then disparate impact may con-
ceivably be consistent with the "enhancing minority outcomes" justification
we have been discussing. But in reducing differences between average
black and white earnings, disparate impact simultaneously increases differ-
ences within the black community and may increase the inter-racial differ-
ences in average utility. As a method for equalizing outcomes between
blacks and whites, therefore, disparate impact (firing) liability is likely
critically flawed.
2. Deterring Disparate Treatment.-Even though motive is formally
irrelevant in establishing liability under a disparate impact standard, one
possible justification for disparate impact is as a means to create liability
in cases in which we believe an employer intended to discriminate but her
intent is impossible to prove. That is, when intentional discrimination is
difficult to prove directly, disparate impact suits might provide a more
viable way of establishing liability.70 Disparate impact might then serve
68. A true Rawlsian analysis proceeds from behind the "veil of ignorance," but also assumes an
extremely conservative (risk averse) "maximin" utility function, in which people assign the highest
priority to raising the welfare of the worst-off person in society. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JuSTICE 136-42 (1971) (introducing the "veil of ignorance" in order to insure pure procedural justice,
i.e., as a means of nullifying the temptations parties would otherwise have to exploit social and natural
circumstances to their own advantage); id. at 152-57 (presenting the "maximin" rule as a heuristic
device for arranging arguments for principles of justice). Clearly, disparate impact, as we have
modeled it, does nothing for the worst-off blacks; its benefits derive entirely from its effects on those
who have jobs, and it actually increases the number of blacks who are not hired at all. Hence it would
clearly fail this Rawlsian test.
69. For a cogent examination of the various "spaces" or domains in which theories of equality
might be advanced (including income, wealth, utility, and "capabilities"), see AMARTYA SEN,
INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (1992).
70. See Paul N. Cox, Substance and Process in EmploymentDiscrimination Law: One View of the
Swamp, 18 VAL. U. L. REV. 21, 108, 108-17 (1983) (describing disparate impact liability as an
approximation of the disparate treatment model that is justified by the "difficulty of establishing illicit
motive.., in the litigation process"). The disparate treatment model embodies the proposition that
.race or gender is an unacceptable basis for decision." Id. at 37. The first sentence of Chief Justice
Burger's opinion in Griggs might be read as suggesting this is what he had in mind:
We granted the writ in this case to resolve the question whether an employer is prohibited
by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, from requiring a high school education or
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to deter at least some instances of explicit or intentional discrimination that
could not be attacked via a "normal" disparate treatment claim.
Until now, we have taken disparate impact at face value by assuming
that it occurred even though the employer had no intent to discriminate.
There are obviously some discriminatory employers in the world, however,
and it is useful to re-examine our model to see how the introduction of
discriminatory motives might change our conclusions about how employers
behave. In doing so, we find it useful to distinguish between several
different kinds of discriminatory behavior.
a. "Non-Standard" Theories.-It might at first seem that firing
discrimination is incompatible with rational behavior by employers. After
all, why would an employer discriminate against someone at the firing
stage, when she could more easily have done so by not hiring them in the
first place?7
There are theories of disparate treatment that predict that employers
will discriminate in firing, even in the absence of hiring discrimination,
however. For example, suppose that discriminatory employers get pleasure
from inflicting harm on black workers-such preferences have been termed
"consequential animus" because employers care about the consequences of
their behavior on those it is designed to harm.' Consistent with the large
literature on the importance of endowment effects, it seems plausible that
workers might suffer more from losing a job they already have than they
would from not getting the job in the first place.' This implies that racist
passing of a standardized general intelligence test as a condition of employment in or
transfer to jobs when (a) neither standard is shown to be significantly related to successful
job performance, (b) both requirements operate to disqualify Negroes at a substantially
higher rate than white applicants, and (c) the jobs in question formerly had been filled
only by white employees as part of a longstanding practice of giving preference to whites.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 425-26 (1971).
71. See, e.g., Donohue& Siegelman, supra note 7, at 1017 ("Claims that employer animus exists
in termination but not in hiring seem irrational: It hardly makes sense to hire workers from a group one
dislikes (thereby incurring the psychological costs of associating with them), only to fire them once they
are on thejob. Such behavior seems doubly irrational given that the expected penalties for terminating
a worker are probably much higher than for failing to hire her.").
72. Consequential animus can also be described as an interdependent utility function in which the
level of a black worker's utility enters negatively as an argument in the utility function of the white
employer. For more on consequential animus, see Ian Ayres, Further Evidence of Discrimination in
New Car Negotiations and Estimates of Its Cause, 94 MicH. L. REV. 109 (1995) (discussing conse-
quential animus as an explanation for why car dealers extract higher prices from disfavored groups).
73. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase
Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990) (reporting the results of various studies testing the theory of
the endowment effect). In more traditional economic models, workers invest in job-specific or firm-
specific human capital as they acquire experience in a given job. Firing would then eliminate these
human capital investments, which would lower workers earnings and utility levels. This formulation
does not seem particularly compelling for a probationary employment model, however, as workers are
only employed for a short time before they are fired.
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employers might find they could hurt blacks more effectively by hiring and
then firing them than by not hiring them at all.74
Finally, an employer could practice what might be called "role-based"
discrimination.75 Such an employer would be willing to hire black
workers as long as they conformed to certain stereotypes or roles such as
acting with "appropriate servility" or speaking with a white accent. Black
workers who failed to play their "assigned" roles on the job would then be
subject to discriminatory firing, even though the employer was willing to
hire them in the first place.
In addition to these "non-standard" theories of discrimination, both of
the traditional economic theories discussed below (associational animus and
statistical discrimination) also predict that disparate treatment in firing is
possible, although under these theories it only occurs in conjunction with
hiring discrimination.
b. AssociationalAnimus.-Animus-based discrimination was first
analyzed by Gary Becker, who modeled it as a psychological distaste on
the part of white employers for associating with black workers.76
Formally, this means that instead of a market wage of w, discriminatory
employers see a wage of w + 6 when they hire a black worker, with b rep-
resenting the psychological cost per period of associating with blacks.
Although there are problems with this formulation,' it is worth thinking
about its implications for firing discrimination.
In our probationary employment model, employers with a distaste for
associating with blacks behave identically to those who are race neutral,
with one exception. An employer's associational animus shifts up the black
firing and hiring lines, so that their new intercept is w + 6 instead of w.78
74. Richard McAdams's status-based model of discrimination might also predict firing discrimina-
tion even in the absence of hiring discrimination-especially if firing blacks is a way for a white
employer to increase his own status. See Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The
Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1003, 1044-63
(1995) (proposing a model of race discrimination based on status production).
75. See Ian Ayres, FairDriving: Gender and RaceDiscrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104
HARV. L. REv. 817, 842 (1991) (discussing the possibility of role-based discrimination in the context
of car sale negotiations, in which "dealers might have discriminated against buyers who acted in ways
that diverged from the dealer's expectation").
76. GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 39-50 (2d ed. 1971).
77. See, e.g., Glen C. Cain, The Economic Analysis of Labor Market Discrimination: A Survey,
in I HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMtCS 693, 713-17 (Orley Ashenfelter & Richard Layard eds., 1986)
(explaining how, in the long run, market forces will push 8 to 0 in Becker's model, so only firms
refraining from discrimination will survive in a competitive market); John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII
Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1411, 1423-30 (1986) (arguing that Title VI supplements market forces
pushing w + 8 to zero); Richard McAdams, supra note 74, at 1036-43 (criticizing the associational
preference model for both overpredicting and underpredicting discriminatory behavior).
78. This is a straightforward implication of the fact that the true wage faced by a discriminatory
employer when hiring a black applicant is w + 8, not w.
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This upward shift of both the hiring and probationary lines lowers the
number of blacks hired, leaves probationary employment unchanged, and
lowers the number of "set" (guaranteed two-period) hires. A greater pro-
portion of probationary hires obviously increases the firing rate for blacks,
which in turn increases the disparity between black and white firing rates.
c. Statistical Discrimination.-Employers might consider the race
of applicants in making hiring decisions not because they care about race
per se, but because race contains information about (is correlated with)
some other characteristic that is not directly observable. In our model,
race is correlated with the average marginal-productivity level (MP) and
average I e , but since both are directly observable, race does not convey
any additional information to employers. Suppose, however, that we alter
the model slightly and now think of MP as a test score that is observable
to employers before hiring. Suppose further that for any observed value
of MP, blacks' "true" productivity on the job will always be ten points
lower than whites' with the identical score, but productivity itself is not
directly observable until the end of the second period. In this case, race
would tell the employer something useful about future productivity, so em-
ployers would have an incentive to make race-conscious hiring decisions.
And they would also make race-conscious firing decisions: because race
and the MP score perfectly predict true productivity, employers absent civil
liability would fire some blacks in period one who would have been
retained had they been white.79
d. Can Disparate Impact Firing Liability Deter Disparate
Treatment?-If disparate treatment in firing is at least theoretically possi-
ble, we must then ask whether disparate impact firing liability is an appro-
priate or effective legal remedy for this problem. Briefly, the answer is,
79. This is not the only way to model statistical discrimination, however. Depending on how
uncertainty about productivity is resolved, some models predict that statistical discrimination may
actually ameliorate disparate treatment in firing. For example, assume the same model as described
in the text, but allow e to be correlated with race as follows: Let PR(e = +I c I) = a, and
PR(e = -I e 1) = (1 - a). Now assume that for whites, a = 1h (as before), while for blacks, a < 'A.
For ,a < 'A, blacks will have a lower mean and smaller variance of e than will whites with the same
value of I e1i. This modification leaves the probationary line for blacks unchanged because the firing
decision is made after any uncertainty about e has already been resolved. However, the black hiring
line does change its slope because the chances of a "good" and "bad" draw post-hiring are no longer
equal. The new hiring line for blacks has the equation
MP = w + [(1 - 3a) / (I + ci)]e.
For a < 'A/, the slope coefficient (in brackets) will be greater than its former value of -l/3; if a < 1/3,
the hiring line will actually have a positive slope. In any case, this upward tilt of the hiring line reduces
the total number of black hires, leaves the "set" (guaranteed two-period) workforee unchanged, and
thus lowers the firing rate for blacks. Depending on the value of a, the black firing rate could be
greater than, equal to, or even less than that for whites.
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"no." By forcing employers to fire fewer blacks and more whites than
they would if they were given free rein, disparate impact firing liability
does push employers towards nondiscriminatory conduct at the firing
stage-but firing liability exacerbates the distorted hiring practices of
discriminatory employers. At least under many of the theories surveyed
above, these employers will already hire fewer black applicants because of
their tastes for discrimination; in any case they will be prompted to hire
even fewer because of the effects of disparate impact firing liability at the
hiring stage. In short, disparate impact firing liability can protect workers
who already have a job from discriminatory firing, but only at the cost of
further reducing the ability of such workers to get hired in the first place.
Moreover, if we believe that only some employers engage in intentional
firing discrimination, disparate impact liability will be overbroad. It will
influence the hiring behavior of all employers, including those who do not
practice disparate treatment in firing.
B. Ameliorating the Perverse Effects of Current Disparate Impact
Enforcement
The core perversity of the current enforcement regime is that forcing
firms to discriminate in favor of minorities in deciding whether to rehire
may induce finns to discriminate against minorities in deciding whether to
hire originally. To ameliorate this legally induced disparate treatment in
hiring, legal reforms might broadly attempt to:
" decrease the cost of firing minorities (relative to firing whites);
or
* increase the cost of failing to hire minorities (relative to failing
to hire whites).
A wide variety of legal instruments could be fashioned to further these
goals, some by extending potential civil rights liability for hiring decisions
and others by reducing potential civil rights liability for firing decisions.
Changing firms' regulatory environment beyond Title VII might also miti-
gate the asymmetric enforcement effect. We will begin by simply cata-
loging a number of possible reforms that might mitigate the perverse
effects of lopsided disparate impact enforcement. We then assess which
reforms best advance the traditional justifications for our civil rights laws.
Rather than thinking simply about antidiscrimination rules that would apply
to all employment decisions, we would do better to distinguish between
hiring and firing decisions in fashioning liability rules.
1. Decreasing the Cost of Firing Minorities.-The most direct way to
reduce the perverse effects of disparate impact protection for minority
firing would be to reduce firms' potential legal liability. Such a reduction
could be accomplished by making it more difficult for plaintiffs to establish
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the relevant pool of qualified candidates for firing, s' or by making it
easier for defendants to establish their business necessity defense to charges
of discriminatory firing. A more modest, but strongly justified, reform
would reduce potential liability by overturning a troubling aspect of
Connecticut v. Teal.8 Suppose a firm's qualified applicant pool is twenty
percent black, its labor force is twenty-five percent black, but its fired
workers during some period are thirty-two percent black. Perversely, the
firm would probably be liable under Teal's "no bottom-line defense"
holding-even if the black share of the firm's labor force after the firing
was still above twenty percent (the minority share of the qualified applicant
pool).' A firm's very success in hiring minorities inequitably increases
its exposure to disparate impact firing claims.' In place of the Teal
standard, we propose allowing defendants a "stock" defense: a firm should
be able to fire minority workers without fear of disparate impact liability
as long as the minority proportion of its workforce stock remains above the
minority share of the qualified applicant pool.'
A firm's expected legal liability might also be lowered by reducing the
potential for disparate treatment firing suits. While disparate treatment is
not the focus of this Paper, Table 2 shows that in the American Bar Foun-
dation sample of recent Title VII suits, a substantial proportion of disparate
treatment firing suits (more than one third) are brought by employees who
were working for the defendant for less than two years (and more than one
quarter are brought by those who have been employed less than a year).
80. Just as the Supreme Court now demands that plaintiffs in a disparate impact hiring suit prove
the minority representation in the qualified applicant pool, courts might reject the notion that all current
employees were equally "well qualified" for firing. Even if the proportion of minorities fired is higher
than the proportion of minorities employed at the firm, a court might require plaintiffs to show that the
proportion of minorities fired was higher than the proportion of minorities among the class of the
employees with the lowest productivity or poorest job performance. Requiring more detailed proof of
the relevant benchmark in firing cases would move a plaintiff's burden in disparate impact firing cases
toward what it would be in a disparate treatment case and hence would make it more difficult to
establish a prima facie case.
81. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
82. Id. at 442 (rejecting a "bottom-line" theory of defense to Title VII actions, under which "an
employer's acts of racial discrimination in promotions-effected by an examination having a disparate
impact-would not render the employer liable for the racial discrimination suffered by employees barred
from promotion if the 'bottom-line' result of the promotional process was an appropriate racial
balance").
83. Teal's "no bottom-line defense" might be maintained in other areas, but eliminated only for
charges of disparate impact in firing. For a pointed attack on the entire decision, see EPSTEIN, supra
note 3, at 229, 226-29 ("The vice of Teal is that it dashes any effort to maintain quality while
simultaneously increasing the percentage of black promotions."). For a defense, see Julie 0. Allen et
al., A Positive Theory of the Employment Discrimination Cases, 16 J. CORP. L. 173, 196, 195-96
(1991) ("[I]f the theory of the Tide VII cases is that an individual may not be impeded in employment
prospects for reasons related to invidious categories, then the majority's opinion is quite coherent.").




It is difficult to calculate the analogous percentage for disparate impact
suits-both because disparate impact suits are more likely to be class
actions with multiple plaintiffs and because there have been relatively few
disparate impact filings. Nonetheless, the substantial proportion of firing
suits brought by plaintiffs who might plausibly still be completing a proba-
tionary period might particularly deter firms from taking chances on
minority hiring.
Table 2: The Proportion of Disparate Treatment Firing Suits Brought By
Arguably Probationary Employees (Observed in a Random Sample of 396
Cases)'
Number of Months Plaintiff







The large number of suits brought by recently hired employees gives
us grounds to worry that the benefits of deterring discrimination in firing
could be less than the costs of the disparate treatment in hiring that this
firing protection may induce. To reduce the potential shadow that firing
liability casts on probationary hiring, firms and their employees might be
allowed to contract out of disparate impact or disparate treatment firing
liability for a short period of time. 6 Such an opt-out provision would
give firms the freedom to take chances with probationary employment of
minorities without exposing themselves to the risk of civil rights liability
for subsequent discharge.
85. The cases were coded from the original complaints and other documents and were sampled
randomly from all filed employment discrimination cases in seven cities (New York, Philadelphia,
Atlanta, New Orleans, San Francisco, and Chicago). For a fuller description of the data, which are
available for public use, see Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 7, at 988-1000. Of 562 disparate treat-
ment firing cases, 166 cases had no information about the duration of the plaintiff's employment before
firing. The percentages reported would be too low if cases brought by short-term employees were less
likely to include the length of the plaintiff's employment. Given adversarial incentives, however, we
see no reason to expect systematic exclusion of long- or short-term employment histories. One litigant
or the other would have a strategic incentive to highlight a long or a short employment tenure.
86. The length of the waiver period could be determined in a number ways. First, the employer
might be able to waive Title VH liability for a period up to some fraction-say, 10%-of the median
length of job tenure. Alternatively, the waiver period could be based on pre-existing probationary
employment practices, see supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text, or on evidence about the length
of time over which the employer was still acquiring information about the worker's productivity.
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2. Increasing the Cost of Firing Whites.-Another way for law to
decrease the relative cost of firing minorities is to increase the cost of
firing whites. One way to accomplish this would be to expand wrongful
discharge liability. If discharged employees could generally challenge the
firm's rationale for firing them, firms would have less reason to hire whites
or minority workers on a probationary basis. Any law that enhances em-
ployees' job security generally (or white job security in particular) will
tend to mitigate the effect of disparate impact firing liability on initial
hiring decisions. Accordingly, a wide range of reforms such as plant
closing laws or replacement worker regulations may affect firms' incentive
to substitute toward white probationary employment. Paradoxically,
minorities should find Title VII's "pseudo just cause" firing protection
more attractive if whites also have such protection, because employers
would no longer have an incentive to substitute away from blacks at the
hiring stage.'
3. Increasing the Cost of Failing to Hire Minorities.-There are
several alternatives that might raise an employer's cost of failing to hire a
minority applicant. Employment audits that utilize matched pairs of
minority/white testers, based on the Fair Housing model, have attracted
considerable attention. 8 While there are legal and other problems with
the use of employment testing, it holds considerable promise as a means of
detecting hiring discrimination.89 We might also consider adjusting the
87. Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers No More:All Workers are Entitledto "Just Cause" Protection
Under Title VI, 2 INDUS. REL. L.J. 519, 561-65 (1978), has argued that since whites are protected
against reverse discrimination under Title VII, and since the McDonneUDouglas/Burdine test essentially
requires employers to offer a valid, nondiscriminatory reason for firings, all workers now have the
equivalent of just cause firing protection. While ingenious, this argument has a major flaw. The
Supreme Court has recently concluded that in order to prevail in a disparate treatment employment
discrimination case, the plaintiff may have to do more than merely refute the employer's proffered non-
discriminatory reason for its actions-the plaintiff might actually be required to show that race explicitly
influenced the employer's conduct. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1993).
Thus, Title VII plaintiffs might have to do more than they would to challenge a discharge under a just
cause standard. For an authoritative recent analysis of the shifting burdens of proof in Title VII cases,
see Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet:Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229
(1995).
88. See, e.g., HARRY CROSS ET AL., EMPLOYER HIRING PRACTICES: DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT
OF HISPANIC AND ANGLO JOB SEEKERS (1990) (presenting an Urban Institute study of hiring practices
in Chicago and San Diego, using hiring audit methodology); MARGERY A. TURNER ET AL.,
OPPORTUNrIES DENIED, OPPORTUNrTIES DIMINISHED: RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING (1991)
(presenting an Urban Institute study of hiring discrimination in Washington, D.C. and Chicago, using
the audit methodology of HUD). For an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of these and other
studies, see James J. Heckman & Peter Siegelman, The Urban Institute Audit Studies: Their Methods
and Findings, in CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE: MEASUREMENT OF DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA
187 (Michael Fix & Raymond Struyk eds., 1993).
89. Among the legal questions not yet fully resolved are whether testers have standing to bring
employment discrimination suits under Title VII. At least one lower court has held that they do. Fair
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lodestar used to calculate attorneys' fees in hiring (but not firing) cases in
order to make hiring cases more attractive to bring (and more expensive
to defend). Finally, tax subsidies for hiring minorities would raise the
costs of failure to hire.90
Many of these alternatives, if applied to disparate impact hiring
liability, would push us towards the hiring quotas that conservatives have
long decried. But now, the rationale behind a hiring quota would be to
counterbalance the perverse effects of a firing quota. As hiring regulations
become increasingly binding on employers, the combination of quotas on
the flows of people hired and fired would in essence create a quota on the
stock of minority employment.9"
We have placed on the table a variety of reforms. Which of these
policies one prefers will be informed by one's views of the purposes of
disparate impact law and about the amount and kind of disparate treatment
in the world.
For example, decreasing the costs of firing blacks will be much more
problematic if one believes that this will unleash a great deal of disparate
treatment in firing. While the prevalence of "pure" firing discrimination
(without discrimination in hiring) is implausible under standard theories of
discrimination based on statistical inference or associational animus, this
threat may be much more salient under theories of consequential animus
and role- or status-based discrimination.
Alternatively, enhancing disparate impact hiring liability would
probably help blacks but would induce disparate treatment against whites
in both hiring and firing, and would thus be inconsistent with the process
rationale for disparate impact.
While it is hard to identify a silver bullet, we tentatively suggest that
some movement on both the hiring and firing margins might be warranted.
Besides repealing Teal, we suggest that augmenting attorneys' fees for
disparate treatment hiring cases and state-sponsored testing might be
combined with a reduction in disparate impact firing liability. This might
be an appealing tradeoff for both advocates and opponents of the civil
rights regime. But in the limited space allowed us in this Symposium, our
goal is primarily to bury the hiring quota theory which has for too long
Employment Council of GreaterWashington, Inc. v. BMC Marketing Corp., 829 F. Supp. 402,403-05
(D.D.C. 1993). Among the practical questions are how to use auditors to detect discrimination at a
single firm, especially if the jobs in question require unusual skills.
90. Inner-city enterprise zones provide an example by analogy of how such programs could be
implemented.
91. For an exploration of the benefits of such a regime, see David A. Strauss, The Law and
Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment: The Casefor Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J.
1619, 1644, 1643-47 (1991) (advocating a shift in focus away from disparate treatment towards a
disparate impact system "seeking to induce employers to hire, promote, and compensate minority
employees in proportion to their numbers in the relevant population").
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distorted our discussion about disparate impact liability. Refocusing on
firing liability changes the terms of the debate.
V. Conclusion
The disparate impact rhetoric of both liberals and conservatives
traditionally focuses on hiring decisions: for example, the debate over the
1991 Civil Rights Act centered on disparate impacts in hiring.9 The
paucity of attention given to firing liability may be a result of the Supreme
Court's reluctance to review disparate impact firing cases. Although we
detailed the dominance of firing cases in the district courts' dockets, a
similar analysis of the Supreme Court reveals a continuing focus on hiring
decisions.' We suggest, however, that this focus on hiring is wrong-
headed: disparate impact liability is likely to be more salient for firing
decisions than hiring decisions. Among disparate impact opinions as a
whole, there are four judicial opinions in firing cases for every one hiring
opinion. This disparity is probably caused by the simple fact that it is
much easier for plaintiffs to prove a prima facie case of disparate impact
in firing than to prove disparate impact in hiring. While our data are not
conclusive, the empirical and doctrinal evidence in support of this
"asymmetric scrutiny" hypothesis at the very least warrants a refocusing
of Title VII scholarship toward the likely effects of disproportionate judicial
scrutiny of firing decisions.
An immediate by-product of this revised focus is the insight that
disparate impact liability is unlikely to induce firms to increase the
employment of traditionally disadvantaged groups. Far from pushing firms
towards minority hiring quotas, the current salience of firing liability might
induce employers to discriminate against minorities in hiring.
The implausibility of the hiring quota critique does not, however,
suggest that the current pattern of disparate impact liability is well tailored
to further Title VII's implicit goals. First, current disparate impact
enforcement is not well suited to reduce disparate treatment. While the
current emphasis on disparate impact firing liability may deter some pre-
existing disparate treatment against minorities in firing, this will only come
at the cost of increasing disparate treatment in hiring.
92. See Michael Carvin, Disparate Impact Claims Under the New Title VII, 68 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1153, 1153 (1993) (attributing the debate over the 1991 Civil Rights Act to the inherent tension
between the notion of prohibiting disparate impact and the Bush Administration's desire to avoid quota
hiring in the workforce).
93. The Supreme Court has relied on disparate impact analysis in five civil rights employment
practices cases since 1971. Three of these were hiring cases: Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490
U.S. 642 (1989); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); and Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971). The remaining two were promotion cases: Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487
U.S. 977 (1988), and Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
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Second, current disparate impact enforcement is not well suited to
increase minority employment prospects. Although disparate impact firing
liability is likely to increase the chance that hired minorities will be
retained, we have shown that it decreases the probability that they will be
hired initially. In many cases, this latter effect will dominate to reduce the
minority wage bill or utility level. And even when the hiring effect does
not dominate, disparate impact firing liability only succeeds by increasing
the variance in minority outcomes. Some minorities are never hired so that
others can achieve better job security.
These troubling side effects of the current disparate impact regime
suggest two complementary strategies for legal reform: either to increase
scrutiny of hiring decisions or to decrease scrutiny of firing decisions. We
offered several means by which these strategies might be accomplished,
and the reader can probably think of many more. In any case, the major
point is that we need to begin thinking about hiring and firing liability as
separate policy instruments with different effects. We should be wary of
using the same rules to regulate discrimination in hiring and firing when
the two kinds of behavior have such different consequences.
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MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
Optimal employer behavior in the probationary employment model
without disparate impact firing liability was fully described in the text.
Briefly, given a wage fixed at w for all workers, employers should hire all
applicants for whom MP - I e 1/3 > w. After learning the exact value of
e in the first period, employers should retain all workers for whom
MP + c > w for an additional period, and should fire all those for whom
this condition is not met. These two rules were graphed in Figure 3; both
are linear, and have an intercept of w, the wage; their slopes are -1/3 and 1
for the hiring and probationary lines, respectively. Even if, as we assume,
the black and white population distributions of MP and I El are different,
the unconstrained employer will choose the same hiring and firing rules for
the two groups.
This appendix demonstrates the optimal hiring and firing rules when
employers are constrained to fire the same proportion of white and black
workers. The problem becomes more complicated with the addition of this
constraint, because employers must now choose the same firing rates for
both races, but are allowed to adjust their hiring behavior at the same time.
We begin by defining four parameters that shift the hiring and firing lines
for each race. Specifically:
New Parameter Definition
x1 Shifts down the (first-period) hiring line for whites. 4
x2  Shifts up the (second-period) firing line for whites.
Y1 Shifts the (first-period) hiring line for blacks.9'
Y2 Shifts down the (second-period) firing line for blacks.
The shifts in the hiring and firing lines caused by these new parameters are
illustrated in Figures 4 and 5.
We now show that the constrained optimum hiring and firing rules can
be defined in terms of these four parameters.' Both the hiring and the
probationary lines are iso-profit curves. The hiring line represents the set
of applicants that an employer is indifferent between hiring and not hiring.
In the unconstrained case, the indifference curve has an intercept of 50 and
a slope of -/. But with the disparate impact firing constraint, this iso-
profit hiring line will have a horizontal component for both blacks and
94. As we will see, the displacement of the hiring line for whites is a function of x1 , but is not
measured by x, directly.
95. Again, the displacement of the hiring line is complicated, and a priori could be either positive
or negative.
96. It is relatively straightforward to show that in the unconstrained case, all four of these
parameters are optimally set to zero.
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whites. For blacks, the shifts in the firm's hiring and probationary lines
mean that some of the marginal hires will be retained with probability 1.
One can readily show that the expected profits from all employees on the
new kinked hiring line are equal. 7 For whites, the shifts in the firms'
hiring and probationary lines mean that in the constrained equilibrium some
of the marginal hires will be retained with probability 0. Again one can
show that the expected profits from all hires along this kinked hiring line
are equal given the employer's optimal firing decisions in the second
period.
Having demonstrated that the employer's optimal hiring and firing
rules in the constrained case can be characterized by the (old) uncon-
strained rules with the four new shift-parameters just introduced, we now
move to calculating the actual values of these new choice variables, given
the distributional and other assumptions we made in setting up the model.
To do so, we write down the (cumbersome but not theoretically difficult)
expressions for expected profits on black and white hires, and then choose
the values of x,, x2, Yl, and Y2 that maximize total profits, subject to the
equal firing rates constraint. Since expected profits are a discontinuous
function of MP and I e1, we need separate expressions for each relevant
region in (MP, I c 1) space." For whites, the employer's problem is:
Max IE( 1 x)-f f 2(MP - 50)(-!)(-L) dMPde5 100
e-O MP-50+x2 e
X1+X2  50+x2+e
+ f f [MP - 50 + e + (.!)*(MP - w e)](.!)(-L) dMPd
e-O MP-50+x2 -e
5 50+x2+e
+ f f [MP - 50 + e + - 50 - e)(i)(--) dMPde
e-0 x1+x2-e
x,+x2  50+x2+e
+ f f (MP-50)(!)(-L)dMPde.
e-0 MP-50-x1
97. For the horizontal portion (where the employee will be retained regardless of her e), the
expected profits are simply 2(MP* - w), where MP* = the height of the horizontal portion. For the
sloped portion (where the employee is only retained if her e is positive), the expected profits are
(MP - e - w) + 2(MP + c - w). It can be shown that these expected profits are equal.
98. The symbolic and numeric integration (used below) were performed using Mathematica, a
sophisticated mathematical software program.
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Subject to
x 1+X 50+.2-e
IDW f f (1)(~~Md
k e-0 MP-50+x
x l +X2 w+x 2-e 5 100
e-w+ f f -!e-O)f MP-wj (00)dMPde
e-0 MP-w-x, e-0 MP-W+X2 .+e
where
X1 +X2  w+X2+eOW -f f
e-0 MP-50 x2 -e
5 50+x2+e(-!)(-L)dMPde+ f f ( d)(#)dMPdP
e'X,+X2 MP.50_xt (x1 +X2-e)
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where
203(Y 1+y'2)LO 50-Y2+ 
-
3 4
=f (L)(-L)dMPdeb f f3 753(y1+Y2) 3 (Y3'+Y2) e
e- MP-50-y 2 -
4 4 3
These two maximization problems yield expressions 7rw*(k) and -b*(k). To
maximize profits subject to the constraint the firm must then maximize
7rw*(k) + 'rb(k) with respect to k, yielding an optimal kF. Using
Mathematica to solve the initial integrals, we performed a numeric grid
search to locate the optimal shifts in the hiring and firing lines which
maximized profits given this constraint. In equilibrium the optimum values
of the 4 shift parameters are: x, =.9824; x2 = 1; yi = .5; y2 = 1.6. The
effects of these shifts on the proportions of blacks hired and fired are
reported in Table 1.
As a check on our results, we also considered, but do not report, the
mathematics of the less-complicated intermediate case, in which the em-
ployer is assumed to be unable to adjust his hiring decisions, so that the
constraint can only be satisfied by a change in firing behavior.' As one
might expect, this intermediate or "naive" problem requires more of an
adjustment in firing rates than is the case when the employer is free to
adjust both hiring and firing policies in order to satisfy the disparate impact
constraint.
99. In terms of the parameters we introduced earlier, this means that the employer can only choose
x, and Y, in order to satisfy the equal-firing-rates constraint.
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